Iranian state media confirmed on Monday that the nation’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium has exceeded 300 kg. This was long seen as the stockpile cap, albeit one Iran has pointed out for months is an entirely voluntary cap at this point.
The cap’s voluntary nature was reiterated today by Iranian FM Javad Zarif, who noted that the slight increase above the limit was not a violation of the P5+1 nuclear deal, and that Iran had a right to revise voluntary measures after the US withdrew from the deal.
Iran enriches uranium to 3.6%, the level needed for fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Weapons-grade uranium must be enriched over 90%, which Iran has never even attempted to do, and which given current safeguards with the IAEA they could not do without a lot of advanced notice.
Unsurprisingly, the one nation really angry at all of this is the United States, who having already withdrawn from the nuclear deal isn’t really in a position to argue about how things are enforced anyhow. President Trump accused them of “playing with fire.”
Other US officials declared the stockpile increase a definite violation, presenting it as vindication for withdrawing from the deal over a year ago. The State Department insisted that the only acceptable move now would be for Iran to permanently halt all civilian enrichment of uranium.
That’s clearly not going to happen. Shutting down civilian enrichment would set back Iran’s production for a long time, and no one who is still a party to the nuclear deal is even suggesting such a move.
“As soon as E3 abide by their obligations, we’ll reverse,” he said, referring to European powers Britain, Germany and France. Iran has demanded they guarantee it the access to world trade envisioned under the deal.”
Sounds reasonable. You hold up your end of the bargain and they’ll do the same. This is between the parties that are still in the deal and the US should mind their own business.
The Europeans are our satraps and, even more so, Israel’s satraps.
Iran wouldn’t need that level of civilian uranium if our brutal embargo didn’t make it necessary to keep the lights on. Action. Reaction. Action.
Iran gets their Bushehr fuel rods from Russia. There’s really no reason they need to be enriching uranium. They are clearly aiming at having the capacity for a break out nuclear weapons program.
Only if by “clearly” you mean “there is precisely zero evidence to support the claim.”
In what universe does the availability of an essential commodity from elsewhere constitute “really no reason” to produce that essential commodity domestically?
Yes, because every nation wants its fuel supply to be liable to being held hostage by a large neighbor who has a history of invading it.
Anyway, what part of an inalienable right to generate and use nuclear energy for peaceful use do we not understand? Every nation has this right.
Don’t they enrich uranium to be converted into fuel rods by Russia?
Straight out of Mossad’s Faerie Tales. Sometimes it’s fun to pretend.
As shown in this article, it is Israel that is largely driving the move to ban Iran’s missile testing program:
http://viableopposition.blogspot.com/2019/07/irans-missile-programs-and-israels.html
While Israel is allowed to protect itself from outside forces with its nuclear weapons and tens of billions of dollars worth of American military equipment, it believes that Iran, a nation that has suffered from missile attacks launched by its next-door neighbour, does not have the same right.
Because Israelis are “god’s chosen people” and Iranians are not. (sarcasm)
*Impossible for Iran to breach the agreement if none of the others is sticking to it.
*Iran should consider labeling Rouhani and Zarif as traitors for even agreeing to no-nukes when Iran was not developing nukes. Past time for Iran to join our BFF Israel in the ME nuke club.
“Impossible for Iran to breach the agreement if none of the others is sticking to it.”
Yes, it is possible for one, some, most, or all parties to breach the agreement, including Iran. They might have good REASONS to breach it, but if they’re breaching it they’re breaching it.
It’s also important to note that it’s no longer just an “agreement.” It’s also a UN Security Council resolution and is therefore binding on all UN member states.
” It’s also a UN Security Council resolution and is therefore binding on all UN member states.”
Apparently, it’s not binding on the US or its EuroVassals–hence it cannot be binding on Iran, the one party that until recently stuck to the letter of the deal (albeit it was dumb to do so).
It’s binding on all of them.
Whether it’s enforceable on all of them is a different question.
In the case of the US, the Senate is responsible for enforcing resolutions, as they pertain to the US……as if….
According to Wikipedia:
Quote:
Specifically, the JCPOA establishes the following dispute resolution process: if a party to the JCPOA has reason to believe that another party is not upholding its commitments under the agreement, then the complaining party may refer its complaint to the Joint Commission, a body created under the JCPOA to monitor implementation.[69][113] If a complaint made by a non-Iran party is not resolved to the
satisfaction of the complaining party within thirty-five days of
referral, then that party could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA, notify the United Nations Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance, or both.[113] The Security Council would then have thirty days to adopt a resolution to continue the lifting of sanctions. If such a resolution is not adopted within those thirty days, then the sanctions of all of the pre-JCPOA nuclear-related UN Security Council resolutions would
automatically be re-imposed. Iran has stated that in such a case, it would cease performing its nuclear obligations under the deal.[58][113] The effect of this rule is that any permanent member of the Security Council (United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia and France) can veto any
ongoing sanctions relief, but no member can veto the re-imposition of sanctions.
End Quote
Note the “non-Iran party” provision. This means that while Iran itself can complain about non-compliance by any party, including the US, the only thing it can do about it is withdraw from the JCPOA if sanctions are re-imposed. This is a “get out of jail free card” for the US.
An article on justsecurity.com says the following:
Quote:
That said, Iran has a non-frivolous argument that even those actions would be JCPOA-compliant in a technical sense. Paragraph 26 of the JCPOA states, in relevant part, as follows:
The United States will make best efforts in good faith to
sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified … The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.
The basic idea here is reciprocity and aligned incentives (key pillars of the whole JCPOA): in the event that the U.S. fails to upholdits sanctions-related commitments, Iran would fail to uphold its nuclear ones. The United States has re-imposed the sanctions it relieved pursuant to the JCPOA and imposed a raft of new sanctions across a range of sectors. And it did so when Iran was upholding its nuclear
commitments. So can Iran, in response “cease performing” in “whole or in part” its JCPOA commitments?
The language of paragraph 26 is a bit squishy. The formulation “Iran has stated” at the beginning of the final, and operative, sentence clearly puts the other JCPOA participants on notice of Iran’s intentions, but does it amount to a meeting of the minds that Iran is permitted to take these actions? It arguably does not. This is in part because it
was foreseen that there may be disagreements about what it meant for the United States to impose new nuclear-related sanctions. For example, would sanctions targeted at a sector subject to relief under the JCPOA, but for ostensibly non-nuclear reasons, count? With this formulation, the United States also avoided giving Iran a pass on ceasing its
performance of nuclear commitments if the U.S. had suspended some of its sanctions commitments for legitimate and proportionate reasons – such as responding to Iranian non-compliance
But in today’s situation, it is abundantly clear that there are no such fine lines to parse. The United States has in fact ceased performing its own JCPOA commitments – in every imaginable way and purposefully. It did not do so in response to Iranian non-compliance. This adds some weight to Iran’s case, but given the wording of paragraph 26 it still does not make it a terribly strong one.
End Quote
Where they get this wrong is that article 26 is not the one that says the party can stop adhering – that’s article 36. See below.
According to a Reuters’ “Factbox”:
Quote:
In a July 1 note sent to member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – and seen by Reuters – Iran said it had officially triggered the nuclear deal’s dispute resolution process on May 10, 2018, after the United States withdrew.
Under that process, if a party is not happy with attempts to address their complaint they can “treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments in whole or in part.”
However, two Western officials with knowledge of the accord, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Iran has never formally triggered the dispute resolution process.
End Quote
I have been unable to find any direct statement by the JCPOA Joint Commission one way or the other on whether Iran has filed a formal complaint to them. One article suggested Iran has filed 11 informal complaints. That’s it.
This is the actual Article 36 of the JCPOA:
Quote:
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM
36.If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration –in parallel with (or in lieu of) review at the Ministerial level -either the complaining participant or the participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be considered by an Advisory Board, which would consist of three members (one each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance
End Quote
Note that at the point where the JCPOA Joint Committee has not resolved the issue, “that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part AND/OR notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issues constitutes significant non-performance.”
I read that to mean that point is where Iran is now. They believe they referred it to the Joint Committee – as well as the foreign ministers of every country which is a signatory and the EU commissioner who coordinates the Joint Committee. Whether that constitutes a “formal complaint” I don’t know. But Iran thinks it does. And as a result, they are ceasing to perform their commitments “in part” – which they *are* allowed to do.
The next step would be for the US or Iran to refer the case to the UNSC. Then and only then could the sanctions be legitimately reimposed if the UNSC decided Iran was in material non-compliance. The out here is that the US has the veto power to prevent any UNSC Resolution continuing the sanctions. This is another “get out of jail free card” for the US, which Iran can do nothing about except withdraw from the Agreement.
The kicker is that since the US has unilaterally withdrawn from the treaty “officially”, it no longer has the right to even complain to the JCPOA Joint Committee about any “Iranian non-compliance.” Only the remaining members in the JCPOA can do so. So the US can theoretically never bring the case to the UNSC because it has to go through the Joint Commission first. So Trump shot himself in the foot by withdrawing. The US has no legal standing any more.
Of course, he doesn’t care because he never intended to go through the process – simply unilaterally withdraw. So under the JCPOA Iran is within its rights to unilaterally cease to comply until the process is followed.