In 11 years of occupation, NATO has repeatedly tried and failed to defeat the Taliban. The Afghan military has grown to 200,000 fighters, but they likewise seem to struggle to even hold their own with them, let alone decisively beat them.
Who does that leave? The civilian population apparently, as US officials are now expressing hope that the civilians in various locations with a Taliban presence will just spontaneously take up arms and sweep themselves to victory.
Officials say its at least possible, citing the cases of a few villages in the Ghazni Province that got sick of Taliban fighters and chased them out of their municipalities. But can a few villages turn into a whole nation?
That’s not clear, and even less clear is if the villagers, who were fed up with Taliban meddling, are going to be any more welcoming to the corrupt Afghan government and NATO occupation forces, or if they are going to turn on any outsiders trying to impose their will on them. If so the uprisings might be an even bigger problem for NATO than the Taliban.
Then the supposed rationale for 'sanctions' hits them… 'maybe if we made them suffer more, then they'd turn on who we don't like.'
That's good.
With honest leaders it would work. Problem is, wealth and power corrupts
Unfortunately, whether the Afghan people have the stomach or will to fight the Taliban on their own…one thing is guaranteed…they won't do it until they get rid of the Occupier Forces first. As the Germans found out, it's counterproductive to try and fight a 2-front war. We've armed them (and also the Taliban, ooops) to the teeth so, leave and let them decide…or not.
That´s an interesting idea, just arm the masses and see who they turn on.
Yeah, look at where all the hope got the US.
Yeah, and they also hoped that Cubans would turn against the Castro with the embargo. That was merely 50 years ago. And Obama also brought us all "hope" and a lot of change…of diapers that is. So, based on these instances along, "hope" in the US is another word for mental masturbation and/or delusion.
We tried it before, in Indochina, with the Strategic Hamlet Program. So far we're not forcibly consolidating Afghan villages like the original program, but given our love of reviving failed programs and strategies I'm sure that's not far off.
And, in the end, look at where we are. Not in Indochina, that's for sure.