Former IAEA deputy director Olli Heinonen, long a critic of his former
employer, accused the IAEA in an interview of letting Iran “weaponize”
uranium. He further claimed that Iran, with “maximum effort,” could produce a nuclear weapon in “six to eight months.”
Neither of these allegations were accurate by any stretch of the
imagination. Heinonen was focusing on Iran improving its centrifuges.
Despite this, Iran is still only enriching uranium to 3.6%, the level
needed for its power plant, and far below the 90%+ needed for
weapons-grade uranium.
Though the centrifuges conceivably could further enrich uranium beyond
the levels presently being done, Iran has never attempted to enrich to
anywhere near the 90% level, and has never suggested that they would
even try.
Figuring out all of the subsequent levels of enrichment to get that high
would be a long process, and going from the creation of weapons-grade
uranium to a weapon, and a weapon to a deliverable warhead are both huge
obstacles themselves, which historically take years for the nation to
accomplish. The 6-8 months is not only unrealistic, it would be
miraculous for any nation to pull off given the well-documented status
of their civilian nuclear program.
Heinonen regularly hypes the “threat” posed by Iran. He is working for
the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a hawkish think tank that
invests a great deal of its time and resources in anti-Iran statements.
No ,it’s not the problem ,Mr Olli .
Problem is that you have just received the marching order to come out of retirement and say something say Anyang against Iran by Israel. How much did they pay you? Bribe by Israel is always weaponized and in less than few seconds .
Which is still the only country to have used atomic/nuclear weapons in anger – the USA.
Which country helped Saddam Hussein to use chemical weapons against Iran – the USA.
The use of depleted uranium in US bombs essentially makes all wars of the US ” nuclear”
“Which country helped Saddam Hussein to use chemical weapons against Iran – the USA.”
Yes … but also Germany, France, Britain … and of course the Gulf countries paid for it all.
Olli Heinonen – why am I not surprised. The day he, a serial fabricator, left the IAEA was one of the IAEA’s better days.
According to Israel, Iran has been ‘6 months away’ from a nuclear weapon since the 80’s- you’d think by now that if they really wanted one they’d have figured it out by now.
Good ol’ Olli … can always count on him for saying something “alarming” about whoever is at the business end of empire. Good little doggie …
Must be a close pal of Bibi or Trump.
Since I have participated in the development of the first well-operating centrifuges for enriching U235 I know how it is possible to increase the U235 concentration in what is called “the product”. One: develop a metal which allows each centrifuge to spin faster. Two: decrease the flow rate through the cascade of centrifuges (1) which, obviously, decreases the yield of now more highly enriched uranium. Three: add centrifuges to make the cascade longer. I am not saying that Iran is doing this. The IAEA would know.
If I knew the so-called enrichment factor of a centrifuge under operating conditions, the number of centrifuges in the current cascade, and the UF6 product (2) flow rate I might be able to estimate the U235 concentration in the product and every current member of the IAEA team ought to be able to do the same. Since Heinonen is no longer on that team he is fantasizing because like me he does not know these three data.
Surreptitiously lengthening the cascade will significantly increase the power consumption which, I understand, the IAEA would instantly learn.
(1) that is the liters of UF6 gas extracted at the high-concentration end of
the cascade which, of course is equal to the liters per minute of fresh UF6
which must be fed into the cascade at the low-concentration end.
(2) see K. Cohen The Theory of Isotope Separation. N.N.E.S, Series III, vol 1B, Mc Graw Hill.
Cool, how current is your expertise?