Saudi Arabian foreign policy in recent years has been informed by having absolute, unquestioned US support. This has driven mounting hostility toward Iran, and was why the Saudis figured they could declare Qatar “the enemy” with impunity.
Saudi officials are starting to second-guess themselves, however, between the US not scrapping ties with Qatar, and not unilaterally attacking Iran any of the many times the Saudis argued there was a pretext to do so. This has forced them to revise a very confrontational foreign policy to one with negotiation.
That’s a huge shift, and the most apparent signs of a Saudi shift are recent negotiations with Qatar, and a recent willingness to directly talk peace with Yemen’s Houthis are years of war.
While some analysts are presenting this as the “fault” of President Trump not attacking Iran back in September, when he blamed them for a drone strike on the Saudis, it isn’t at all clear why this is a bad thing in the first place.
It isn’t clear anyone benefited from Saudi Arabia believing they could declare Qatar such an enemy that they could blockade them and threaten to dig a channel along the border to turn Qatar into an island, or that diplomacy as such was beneath them. Diplomatic engagement might even end the Yemen War, which is something much of the world has been calling for for a long time.
It’s unlikely that President Trump did this by design, as his statements have repeatedly been that support of the Saudis is unchanged, and he keeps throwing more US troops at Saudi Arabia to “protect them.”
Note to Saudi Arabia – America has only one sweetheart and it is Israel.
Israel is not our sweetheart – it is our master. Both brands of “The Party” are subservient to Israeli Zionists. That Party btw is “AIPAC/WALLSTREET/MIC” Party
Gee, maybe Israel would feel they need to talk to Iran and the Palestinians if we stopped our unquestioning support of them.
According to BBC, Saudi Arabia asked Russia to join investigation into September attacks. This I assume is the real reason behind troops shuffle. In the increased deployment, it is easy to hide rotations. Meaning new crews manning air defense systems, the crews present at the September attack will not be there any more. There will be extensive shielding of access to Patriot data. Russia will be very likely confined to examining attacked facilities and fragments of weapons found.
Either way, however limited, Russian military presence on Saudi soil is unnerving to US. Dealing with Qatar and Yemen not involving US mediation is the logical consequence of US conveniently distancing itself from both — but now it has backfired as no leverage exists.
“It’s unlikely that President Trump did this by design”
Very.
It looks like the holidays are over early and the world can get on with killing itself…
Thank the Houthis. Getting your ass handed to you by a bunch of wily peasants tends to be a humbling experience.
I am constantly amazed at the superficial nature of our tracking events in the Gulf. Thus, many things are literally upside down. Literally.
Qatar, for example. The whole mess started after Trump visited Saudi Arabia. At that time, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Nayaf, having concentrated power in his hands ever since becoming Minister of the Interior — was in the ropes. He picked up General Petraeus’ Iraqi Sunni Awakening, armed Sunni group that started executing Shia in Iraq — and transformed it i to a well commanded, well funded, well armed and ideologically Wahhabi sect. He saw it take over good part of Iraq and Syria. He was promoted by US to become Crown Prince, as he did in 2015. ISIS was at the height of power, recruiting worldwide using Western portal servers, satellite communications and social media.
But by the end of 2015 — Russia entered Syria, and ISIS was defeated in areas not claimed by US air control rather quickly. There were other large non-ISIS militant groups in Syria, including Al-Qaeda, and US and collective West called them “rebels”, defending them to bitter end.
In Baghdad, Russia Iran and Iraq formed Intelligence sharing center,. Thus, Iraqi forces were making progress, while US only benefited Iraqi PKK Kurds against Pershmerga Kurds.
So, when Trump visited in 2017, campaigning on the promise of destroying ISIS — which he saw was heading for the exit already — Crown Prince was desperate to salvage Saudi investment in money and reputation.
Trump suggested to declare Qatar the sponsor of terrorism — and get Qatar to ditch Iran as energy partner. To US looked like a win-win, Qatar in trouble, with US air base, needing US support and more obedient, while giving Saudis the honors of declaring Qatar sponsor of terrorism.
But it was the last act of a desperate man — he was toppled in a palace coup, in June 2017 by the ruling council, and MBS became Crown Prince. IMMEDIATELY afterwards, a meeting was held in Cairo — changing ALL conditions given Qatar into PRINCIPLES. For all intents, crisis was over. The rest was theatre. And as Turkey sent troops, and Iraq supplied Qatar with most goods to meet demand — Qatar was not anxious for US support. Saudi contacts increased, and Qatar was present in GCC meeting in Riyadh last year, then OIC meeting.
But it was clear which way this was going. This is not the first time Saudis are working with Houthis. Last time UAE sabotaged the deal, by capturing and holding hostage former President’s Salleh’s son, so the deal he worked on would collapse. It cost Saleh his head.
Things have changed now drastically as Kurds in Syria have lost — and their enclaves in Afrin under Turkey , and Kobane under Syria Government.
With US not being able to push Saudis into war with Iran , and not willing to go unilaterally— the feeling is US has lost its power to coerce.
This is why they are seeking some closure on number of fronts. And save money. Last month invited Russia’s military investigators to join investigative team on September bombings.
Saudis are merely diversifying. It is clear on all fronts. There are some in US hoping to return to happier days of MBN. But so far, MBS is here to stay.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-30/saudi-buying-of-treasuries-is-soaring-under-trump
Saudi purchases of treasuries is soaring under President Trump. At one point within the last eight years, the Saudis threatened to sell $750 billion in treasuries as a response to 9/11 claims.
This gives credence to my understanding that the Saudis may have had US treasury accumulations nearing $1.5 trillion.
Current exposure of around $177 billion probably significantly low balls the actual figure, if this antiwar.com article has any reliability.
It’s rare that I read an article by Jason Ditz that’s off-base, and certainly that’s so far off-base, but it’s ridiculous to think, let alone to write an article for antiwar.com that maintains that the KSA WANTS a hot war with Iran, which of course would follow with any “unilateral attack [againts] Iran any of the many times the Saudis argued there was a pretext to do so” (and dutifully reading from the script prepared for them by the CIA every time), as Saudi cities and infrastructure would most assuredly be toast at the outset of any hot war. Iran would of course do worse with all the mini-nukes and the DU that would coat the place (much of it blowing east into and over Pakistan and Afghanistan), but the Gulf states are on the front lines and know it. This coming war will be all about oil and gas, $$ for the military-industrial-bottomless-hole (the real reason for the KSA war with Yemen, $$ for wearpons, and which was also a means to provoke Iran, or to generate false flags). I remember reading some time ago and within days of the release of the trove of diplomatic correspondence by Wikileaks leaked by Chelsea Manning that it was remarkable how the cables revealed how unduly impressed KSA leaders and diplomats seemed to be with the Americans (specifically the CIA?) which put paid to the myth or the propaganda that the tail (the KSA) has been wagging the dog or dogs (the CIA and the Pentagon) for years. The KSA leadership has been following the script for years at least on the important points, but it seems that they’ve been increasingly spooked by moves towards what will be a very real and very hot war, and the bombing of oil infrastructure by the Houthis (who had “help” from within the KSA [the CIA?]) with the resulting arrival of troops en masse, is ringing alarm bells. Certainly the UAE doesn’t want a war as Dubai will be taken out. The Saudis might have begun to question the information received that the tanker attacks were just theatre and posturing to justify tightening sanctions and for market share. And as for the spat with Qatar, that might have had at least something to do with western punishment for Al Jazeera, and so I’ve read (the timing with the impending release of the documentary ‘the lobby’ would otherwise be supernatural). If the media would report that the Saudis are or might well be spooked by the increasingly possibility of a hot war with Iran, wouldn’t that be cause for concern for everyone and might that not put a spotlight on the situation?
I would say that the Saudi calculation looks something like this:
1) It’s unlikely that a hot war between the US and Iran would severely impact KSA’s oil infrastructure.
2) At the same time, the war’s impact on shipping, the complete short-term destruction of Iran’s oil infrastructure, and the general uncertainty would both drive up the price of oil and send it new customers who used to buy from Iran.
Whether that calculation is correct or not is a different question, but that’s my take on their thinking.
How reassuring for anyone, really, who might be concerned that we’re at the brink of the nastiest war since WWII. But can you explain why you gather that the Saudis would think that a war with Iran would be “unlikely” to “severely impact KSA’s oil infrastructure”? A google search immediately took me to this link.: https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/iran/ “In addition to increasing the quantity of its missile arsenal, Iran is investing in qualitative improvements to its missiles’ accuracy and lethality. Iran has also become a center for missile proliferation, supplying proxies such as Hezbollah and Syria’s al-Assad regime with a steady supply of missiles and rockets, as well as local production capability. … Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East, with thousands of short- and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles …” And here’s an article re Iran’s sudden emergence as a local ‘drone superpower’, written before the bombing in September. : https://thehill.com/opinion/international/453437-iran-is-becoming-a-drone-superpower And in September the Saudis learned that their missile and drone defenses might not be as effective as initially bargained for.
Pro-war propaganda includes that which seeks to reassure that a hot war ISN’T around the corner when all the evidence suggests that it is or that it could well be, and that we shouldn’t be too concerned, let alone make a fuss and speak out, protest, etc. But this is Antiwar.com. Of course, you’ll find plenty of support for your position in an abundance of articles online, such as this from the NYT, reprinted here: https://www.observerbd.com/details.php?id=221277 and this https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/taken-to-brink-by-trump-gulf-states-are-backpedaling-on-iran-1.1355913 but rather than stating that the Saudis have learned from “Trump’s refusal to retaliate against Iran for the Sept. 14 attack” (in spite of the lack of evidence that confirms that it was Iran and not the Houthis (‘with help’), who launched the drones, and from SW Iran no less), with the further drum-beating and the arrival of troops, I haven’t read anything more consistent with recent events than that the Saudis and the Gulf states have had a taste of what a war with Iran would look like, or at least the outset of one, and that they’re spooked that it is or that it could be around the corner.
The accepted wisdom is that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz “would be catastrophic for oil markets”, and according to MBS, a war with Iran would collapse the global economy ( https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/saudi-arabia-mbs-war-iran-collapse-global-economy-190930011429697.html ), hardly an endorsement. According to Robert McNally, president of Rapidan Energy Group and former advisor to Bush, “[i]n 2008, worries that Iran would blockade the strait helped to send oil prices skyrocketing to a record $147/b, a level not achieved since. A hot war in the Gulf, especially prolonged closure of Hormuz or severe damage to [the giant oil processing facility of] Abqaiq, would send crude prices well into the triple digits. That price spike would slam growth, crush oil demand, and trigger an oil price reversal to the low double digits [!!].”
“Abqaiq could be the Achilles’ heel of Saudi Arabia’s oil industry. Located in the kingdom’s eastern province, the facility filters impurities such as sulfur and gas from around 7 million b/d of crude. This is roughly equal to the country’s entire exports and a volume of readily available crude that is impossible to replace easily. Destroy it and experts fear an uncontrollable panic would grip oil markets and the global economy. Saudi Arabia’s enemies also know it. Al Qaeda terrorists went for the jugular in 2006, but were unsuccessful in an attack on the plant. Since then, the Saudi authorities have beefed up their defenses around Abqaiq to fortress-like proportions with what is effectively a private army guarding the facility. In the wake of the Jihadi attack, state-run Aramco insisted Abqaiq was not critical to its operations, but experts still aren’t convinced. If the oil market has a beating heart, it is Abqaiq,” warns McNally. https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/articles/us-war-with-iran-unlikely-but-would-devastate-oil-markets-fuel-for-thought The author of this article wrote it back in May (before the Aramco bombing in September), stating that “Saudi Arabia has stepped up efforts to increase export capacity from its Red Sea coast via pipeline [with] the opening of a new terminal last year at Yanbu Port with capacity to ship 3 million b/d of crude. However, the drone attack on its 744-mile East-West Pipeline has once again proved how vulnerable its vital oil infrastructure remains. [!] Combined, these incidents give the impression of a region on the brink of war, a risk oil markets have ignored.”
The Saudis might much prefer the status quo. Iran is very limited as to whom they can sell their oil, and gas from their vast reserves, and as to how much just now. But a war won’t bomb their oil and gas away, which can be sold by the Americans or with their blessing after regime change. And how would that benefit the Saudis?
To be clear, I don’t have a good sense of how much closer the US is or might be to war with Iran now, post-September, than in the summer, but it just doesn’t ring true that the Saudis or the Gulf states have begun “to second-guess themselves” as the US hasn’t “unilaterally attack[ed] Iran” as yet, setting off a war that would surely engulf the whole region. In fact, I’m concerned that the Saudis’ ‘back-pedaling’ on Iran might be a warning that they don’t like where this seems to be going. But it could be that the attack on Aramco was a reality check (as per the comments above re Abqaiq) and that the Saudis are seeking to take a break to reconsider things. Again, if the Saudis now feel that they might have been misled by the US, it might not have been as to whether or not the Americans would start or fight a war with Iran, but rather as to how well they could protect the KSA and its infrastructure.
“But can you explain why you gather that the Saudis would think that a war with Iran would be ‘unlikely’to ‘severely impact KSA’s oil infrastructure?'”
Sure:
In war, smart commanders use their weapons in such a way as to affect the outcome of the fight.
A war pitting Iran against US and allied forces would not be a long enough war for destroying oil infrastructure to materially affect the outcome.
Therefore, if Iranian commanders are not idiots, they will use their missiles to target enemy forces and the infrastructure that immediately facilitates the deployment of those forces, rather than wasting those missiles.
I suppose it’s possible that the Iranian military command apparatus is staffed entirely by idiots. But I wouldn’t bet on it.
You write that “[a] war pitting Iran against US and allied forces would not be a long enough war for destroying oil infrastructure to materially affect the outcome.” How so? Destruction of infrastructure and the threat of further destruction, including that of anything the Saudis et al. would repair or replace would be an incentive to end the war. Again, Iran is a “centre for missile proliferation” with thousands of short- and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, and is emerging as a local drone superpower. And Iran has proxies in Yemen and elsewhere. According to Wikipedia “drones are too difficult to detect by traditional methods, cheap, and extremely accessible … According to Justin Bronk, research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, “the cost curve is very favorable to the attacker, meaning Saudi Arabia would have to spend far more than its enemies to protect against additional strike capabilities. As such, there is almost no way the Kingdom can completely defend against such attacks.” I guess the question comes down to how soon you might expect hostilities, if not a conventional war, to end. How soon would regime change be brought about, and would there be a resistance from former members of the IRGC perhaps with access to drones and missiles, hidden in the Zagros and elsewhere, and in Iraq and Yemen?
Or do you expect the Americans to go beyond ‘mini-nukes’ and drop something much bigger and uglier, ala Aug. 1945?
– Or could the ugly potential for ‘terrorism’ at a level not yet seen to date in the KSA as things drag on be a consideration for the admin there (which might not be “staffed entirely by idiots”) as they ‘backpedal’? I’m here to learn.
“I guess the question comes down to how soon you might expect hostilities, if not a conventional war, to end.”
“Hostilities” have been going on for 40 years now and aren’t likely to end any time soon.
How long a conventional war would last would depend on the objectives. If the objective was occupation and “nation-building,” it would drag on forever and a day. If the objective was the reduction of Iran’s conventional military capabilities to so close to zero as to be indistinguishable, without the use of nukes of any size and absent direct intervention by another substantial military power (Russia, China, or India), it might last as long as a month, but I’d bet the under on that over/under.