The tiny farming community of Marjah, the location of what is to this point
is the single largest US military operation in Afghanistan since the 2001 invasion, was supposed to be the turning point for the war, at least from a public image standpoint.
A “city of 80,000 people” (which it never was), a key Taliban stronghold (likewise, the only reason it remained unattacked was because it was uniquely irrelevant in Helmand Province), Marjah was supposed to be the perfect location to test the “clear and hold” strategy.
US troops did clear it, eventually. The battle was fiercer than it was supposed to be, in no small part because the US was publicly announcing its planned invasion for over a month, but it was captured. Holding, however, is another matter.
In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, top defense officials are admitting that even now, months after the invasion began, the US military is more or less stuck in this do-nothing farming village, because they can’t convince what few trained Afghans there are in the Karzai government to come and take control.
An invasion to prop up a Karzai-appointed governor was a questionable strategy in the first place, but the complete inability of the Karzai government to maintain a mostly irrelevant village, even temporarily, speaks to an absolute lack of US planning ahead of the offensive.
How about a help wanted ad in the Kabul Gazette: "Wanted: Afghans to solidify American Occupation of Marjah. No experience needed. Good pay, medical benefits, life insurance provided."
Directly related to this subject is the recent transcript Scahill just released of one of Erik Prince's "private" (no press allowed) speeches.
In it Prince discusses "training Afghans."
The very close and sensitive observer will observe in Prince's remarks on that subject almost all the psychological flaws in the US and NATO invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, and why it is now dangerously close to finding at last its 1842.
This would take a long essay to discuss in detail, or to explain to those without the right "cultural" experience and insight. But those who have both will understand immediately.
A brief essay of what I think EAC is referring to. And yea, I had to google it. :-)))
British forces in Afghanistan leave Kabul January 6 under pressure from Pashtun tribesmen who have promised them safe conduct back to India (see 1841). Lord Auckland has 4,500 Anglo-Indian troops under his command and is accompanied by 10,000 camp followers, but from January 6 to 13 Akbar Khan and his Ghilzai tribesmen use long-barreled rifles (jezails) to massacre all but 121 of Auckland's men at Jugdulluck (Gandamack) on the Kabul-Jellalabad road in the Khyber Pass, slaughtering the camp followers and perhaps 15,000 camels. Akbar's father, Dost Mohammed, regains the throne that he held from 1835 to 1839 and will keep until his death in 1863; a punitive force from India under General Sir George Pollock, 56, forces the Khyber Pass (the first army in history to do so), relieves the siege of Jellalabad April 16, and reoccupies Kabul in September, burning the Great Bazaar in retribution, but the emirs of Sind have shown hostility toward the British, and London gives Scottish soldier General Sir Charles (James) Napier, 58, complete civil and military authority to deal with them rather than leaving that authority to the resident governor (see 1843). The British and their sepoy troops withdraw from the exposed position in October on orders from London.
Here's the link I used, scroll down:
http://www.answers.com/topic/1842
A brief essay of what I think EAC is referring to. And yea, I had to google it. :-)))
British forces in Afghanistan leave Kabul January 6 under pressure from Pashtun tribesmen who have promised them safe conduct back to India (see 1841). Lord Auckland has 4,500 Anglo-Indian troops under his command and is accompanied by 10,000 camp followers, but from January 6 to 13 Akbar Khan and his Ghilzai tribesmen use long-barreled rifles (jezails) to massacre all but 121 of Auckland's men at Jugdulluck (Gandamack) on the Kabul-Jellalabad road in the Khyber Pass, slaughtering the camp followers and perhaps 15,000 camels. Akbar's father, Dost Mohammed, regains the throne that he held from 1835 to 1839 and will keep until his death in 1863; a punitive force from India under General Sir George Pollock, 56, forces the Khyber Pass (the first army in history to do so), relieves the siege of Jellalabad April 16, and reoccupies Kabul in September, burning the Great Bazaar in retribution, but the emirs of Sind have shown hostility toward the British, and London gives Scottish soldier General Sir Charles (James) Napier, 58, complete civil and military authority to deal with them rather than leaving that authority to the resident governor (see 1843). The British and their sepoy troops withdraw from the exposed position in October on orders from London.
Here's the link I used, scroll down:
http://www.answers.com/topic/1842
It also speaks to the lack of support the US plan really has.
Afghans Afghans everywhere, but none trusted to take control.
Its speaks to the unpopularity and lack of power the central government has.
The US propaganda writers speak of this central government as what we are fighting for. But its so weak it can't even find flunkies in the region who are willing to suck up to it in order to gain local power.
They try to spin this as if the problem is that they can't get the beauracrats to leave Kabul, but beauracrats always want to be at the center and view some small provincial appointment as a setback to their careers. But, usually a central gov can find a few local quisling types to rule in its name in exchange for a cut of the profits and a spot on the helicopter out of town when the government leaves. But, this government that we are propping up is so powerless out towards Marjah that it can't even get anyone to do that.
What a wonderful example of the problem of trying to spread freedom and democracy at the point of a gun.
You vill be free! You vill be free! You vill be free! We are hear in our our might to command you to be free. And if you don't be free when we tell you to be free, then by gawd we'll force you to be free.
Afghans Afghans everywhere, but none trusted to take control.
Its speaks to the unpopularity and lack of power the central government has.
The US propaganda writers speak of this central government as what we are fighting for. But its so weak it can't even find flunkies in the region who are willing to suck up to it in order to gain local power.
They try to spin this as if the problem is that they can't get the beauracrats to leave Kabul, but beauracrats always want to be at the center and view some small provincial appointment as a setback to their careers. But, usually a central gov can find a few local quisling types to rule in its name in exchange for a cut of the profits and a spot on the helicopter out of town when the government leaves. But, this government that we are propping up is so powerless out towards Marjah that it can't even get anyone to do that.